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IN COLD TYPE: STATUTORY APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE
OFFENDER AS AUTHOR
INTRODUCTION
The disposition by a criminal offender of the
rights to the story of his crime has been a subject
of public controversy for several years.1 Because of
public curiosity about infamous crimes, publishers
occasionally offer criminals lucrative contracts for
the tales of their offenses.2 However, many people
feel that allowing criminals to retain the revenues
from the stories of their crimes results in unjust
enrichment.3 In response, several states have passed
1 See, e.g., Checkbook Journalism, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29,
1969, at 45; Taking a Criminal to Civil Court, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 23, 1979, at 22D; Selling a Client's Story, TIME, Jan.
19, 1970, at 62.
2 A number of reported cases and newspaper articles
illustrate the amount of funds which can be placed at the
disposal of a criminal offender for the story of his crime.
For example, in 1970, Susan Atkins, a member of the
"Manson family," directed payment of $52,500 to her
attorney and $131,250 to a trust for the benefit of her son
for an interview detailing her involvement in the Sharon
Tate murder case. See articles listed in note I supra. At
the same time, the attorney for Charles Watson, who was
also implicated in the murders, was seeking $50,000 in
exchange for the right to interview his client. Id. James
Earl Ray, the convicted murderer of Martin Luther King,
directed payment of at least $40,000 in royalties to his
attorneys for the story of his crime. Ray v. Rose, 535 F.2d
966, 971 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976). See
also Ray v. Foreman, 441 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972).
In the only reported case decided under the New York
statute considered in this note, Warner International
Corporation paid approximately S43,000 to the New
York Crime Victim's Compensation Board. These funds
represented the earnings of John Wojtowicz for the
release of his rights to the motion picture reenactment of
a bank robbery he had committed in 1972. The film was
entitled, "Dog Day Afternoon" (1975). The court in that
case held, inter alia, that a bank manager who was held
hostage during the robbery could bring suit in 1978
against Wojtowicz for grounds of assault and battery and
false imprisonment and recover anyjudgment in his favor
out of the proceeds of the film rights. Barrett v. Wojtow-
icz, 94 Misc. 2d 379, 404 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1978), aff'd, 66
A.D.2d 604, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979). See also note 24
infra.
3 A number of people have expressed concern that
the widespread publicity surrounding a crime can
result in the criminal wrongdoer receiving lucrative
fees for books, articles, interviews and the like. These
people see such income on the part of the wrongdoer
as unjust enrichment and have proposed that such
income be held in escrow by the State in order to
laws to prevent such profiteering by criminals.4 For
example, New York enacted its literary profits
pay claims made against the wrongdoer by the
victims of the crimes which led to the unjust enrich-
ment.
Victims of Crime Compensation, H.R. REP. No. 95-1762,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted at 124 CoNo.
REc. 12366, 12368 (1978). See also note I supra.
In 1977, a bill submitted in the House of Representa-
tives would have provided federal funding for state crime
victims' compensation programs. It established several
requirements for the eligibility of states:
There is in effect in the state a law or rule
requiring any person contracting directly or indi-
rectly with an individual formally charged with or
convicted of a qualifying crime for any rendition,
interview, statement, or article, relating to such
crime to deposit any proceeds owing to such individ-
ual under the terms of the contract into an escrow
fund for the benefit of any victims of such qualifying
crime or any surviving dependents of any such vic-
tim, if such individual is convicted of that crime, to
be held for such period of time as the state may
determine is reasonably necessary to perfect the
claims of such victims or dependents.
H.R. 7010, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The conference committee on this bill rejected this
provision on several grounds, noting that it raised serious
constitutional questions. This conclusion was based on
the modeling of this provision upon the New York statute
and the finding of the American Law Division of the
Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service that
"serious constitutional issues are raised by [the New York]
legislation: The main constitutional issues raised concern
the due process clause of the 14th Amendment and the
1st Amendment protection for freedom of speech and
press."
H.R. 7010, as amended, was defeated in the House of
Representatives on October 14, 1978. 124 CoNe. REc.
13030 (1978). There are, however, currently on the floor
of the House at least two bills to provide federal funding
for crime victims compensation programs with provisions
which are identical to that in the original version of H.R.
7010 requiring a qualifying state to have a law attaching
the offender's profits from the story of his crime. H.R. 99,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and H.R. 4257, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). On February 13, 1980, the House Judi-
ciary Committee recommended the passage of H.R. 4257.
H.R. REP. No. 753, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
4 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.165 (Supp. 1979); ARiz. REv.
STAT. § 13-4202 (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401
(Rev. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (Supp. 1979); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 401 et seq. (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT.
§ 299 B.17 (Supp. 1979); and NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1836
et seq. (Supp. 1979.).
statute, Executive Law § 632-a, to prevent the
"Son of Sam" killer from profiting from his mur-
ders. 5 The majority of the statutes curbing criminal
rewards are modeled after New York's law.6 Under
that statute, anyone who contracts for the story of
5 N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
The author of the legislation specifically noted his moti-
vation in writing this bill:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency
that an individual, such as the forty-four caliber
killer, can expect to receive large sums of money for
his story once he is captured-while five people are
dead, other people were injured as a result of his
conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all
criminal situations, the victim must be more impor-
tant than the criminal.
Memorandum of Senhtor Emanuel R. Gold, 1977 New
York State Legislative Annual. See also N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1977, at 20, col. 3.
6 The New York statute, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a
(McKinney Supp. 1979), provides:
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, as-
sociation or other legal entity contracting with any
person or the representative or assignee of any per-
son, accused or convicted of a crime in this state,
with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape record-
ing, phonograph record, radio or television presen-
tation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the
expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding
such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to
the board and pay over to the board any moneys
which would otherwise, by terms of such contract.
be owing to the person so accused or convicted or
his representatives. The board shall deposit such
moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of and
payable to any victim or the legal representative of
any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such con-
victed persons; or (ii) by such accused person, but
only if such accused person is eventually convicted
of the crime and provided that such victim, within
five years of the date of the establishment of such
escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judg-
ment for damages against such person or his repre-
sentatives.
2. The board, at least once every six months for five
years from the date it receives such moneys, shall
cause to have published a legal notice in newspapers
of general circulation in the county wherein the
crime was committed and in counties contiguous to
such county advising such victims that such escrow
moneys are available to satisfy money judgments
pursuant to this section. For crimes committed in a
county located within a city having a population of
one million or more, the notice provided for in this
section shall be in newspapers having general cir-
culation in such city. The board may, in its discre-
tion, provide for such additional notice as it deems
necessary.
3. Upon dismissal of charges or acquittal of any
accused person the board shall immediately pay over
to such accused person the moneys in the escrow
a person accused or convicted of a crime must
deposit the proceeds of the contract with a crime
victims' compensation board. The board holds the
funds in escrow for five years, during which it
releases amounts only for attorneys' fees and for
restitution to the victims of the offender's crime. At
the conclusion of the five-year period, the offender
receives any funds remaining in the account.
Many commentators charge that the New York
statute is unconstitutional. They allege that it
account established on behalf of such accused per-
son.
4. Upon a showing by any convicted person that
five years have elapsed from the establishment of
such escrow account and further that no actions are
pending against such convicted person pursuant to
this section, the board shall immediately pay over
any moneys in the escrow account to such person or
his legal representatives.
5. For purposes of this section, a person found not
guilty as a result of the defense of mental disease or
defect pursuant to section 30.05 of the penal law
shall be deemed to be a convicted person.
6. Whenever it is found, pursuant to article seven
hundred thirty of the criminal procedure law ...
that a person accused of a crime is unfit to proceed
as a result of mental disease or defect because such
person lacks capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his own defense, the board
shall bring an action of interpleader pursuant to
section one thousand six of the civil practice law and
rules to determine disposition of the escrow account.
7. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the
civil practice law and rules with respect to the timely
bringing of an action, the five year period provided
for in subdivision one of this section shall not begin
to run until an escrow account has been established.
8. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this
section the board shall make payments from an
escrow account to any person accused or convicted
of crime upon the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction after a showing by such person that such
moneys shall be used for the exclusive purpose of
retaining legal representation at any stage of the
proceedings against such person, including the ap-
peals process.
9. Any action taken by any person accused or con-
victed of a crime, whether by way of execution of a
power of attorney, creation of corporate entities or
otherwise, to defeat the purpose of this section shall
be null and void as against the public policy of this
state.7 Am. Law Division, Cong. Research Service, Lib. of
Congress, Constitutional Analysis of a New York Statute
Requiring Funds Received by Alleged Criminals for
Certain Purposes to be Given to Their Victims, Sept. 8,
1977 (hereinafter Constitutional Analysis). See Note,
Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims' Rights v. Freedom of Speech,
54 IND. L.J. 443 (197q) (hereinafter Criminals-Turned-
Authors), and Note, Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds
of the Criminal's Story-The Constitutionality of the New York
Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 93 (1978) (here-
inafter Compensating the Victim).
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violates the first amendment because it chills the
offender's right to speak and infringes upon the
public's right to know because it immediately elim-
inates all of the offender's profit.8 It is also attacked
under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as requiring an unconstitutional pre-
judgment seizure.9
One state has departed from New York's model.
That state, Florida, places a statutory lien on the
proceeds of a convicted felon's account of his
crime.10 Once this lien has been perfected, the
8 See note 7 supra. A question was raised as to whether
the statute also violates the publishing media's right of
access. It was correctly concluded, however, that the
Supreme Court in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974),
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974),
found that the press does not have any greater right of
access to information than that of the general public. 14
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. at 112-13. See also Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972), "It has generally been
held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to informa-
tion not available to the public generally." (Citations
omitted).
9 See Constitutional Analysis and Compensating the Vic-
tim, supra note 7.
" The relevant Florida Statutes state:
(1) A lien prior in dignity to all others shall exist in
favor of the state upon royalties, commissions, pro-
ceeds of sale, or any other thing of value payable to
or accruing to a convicted felon or a person on his
behalf, including any person to whom the proceeds
may be transferred or assigned by gift or otherwise,
from any literary, cinematic, or other account of the
crime for which he was convicted.
(2) The proceeds of such account shall be distrib-
uted as follows:
(a) Twenty-five percent to the dependents of the
convicted felon.
(b) Twenty-five percent to the victim or victims
of the crime or to their dependents, to the extent
of their damages as determined by the court in
the lien enforcement proceedings.
(c) An amount equal to pay court costs, which
shall include jury fees, and expenses, court re-
porter fees, and reasonable per diem for the pros-
ecuting attorneys for the state, shall go to the
General Revenue Fund. Additional costs shall be
assessed for the computed per capita cost of im-
prisonment in the state correctional institution.
Such costs shall be determined by the Auditor
General.
(d) The rest, residue, and remainder to the con-
victed felon upon his or her release or parole or
[upon the expiration of his or her sentence].
(3) The Department of Offender Rehabilitation is
hereby authorized and directed to report to the
Department of Legal Affairs the existence or reason-
ably expected existence of circumstances which
would be covered by this section. Upon such notifi-
cation, the Department of Legal Affairs is authorized
and directed to take such legal action as is necessary
funds are distributed in the following manner: 25%
of the money to the dependents of the offender; up
to 25% to the victims of the crime or their depen-
dents to the extent of their damages as determined
by the court; up to 50% to the state for its costs in
prosecuting and incarcerating the offender. Any
remaining funds are paid to the offender upon his
release or parole.
Because of the number of states which have
adopted statutes based on the New York provisions
and because of the importance of preventing unjust
enrichment by the offender, it is crucial to examine
the criticisms of the New York statute. In addition,
the Florida statute must be examined as an alter-
native for achieving the same goals through more
constitutional means.
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A full analysis of the impact of the New York
and Florida statutes on first amendment rights is
a multistep process. First, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the literary works involved in the
statutes are subject to first amendment protec-
tion." Second, if the works are protected, consid-
eration must be given to whether the statutes deter
the offender from exercising his rights to produce
them.12 If deterrence occurs, the manner in which
it operates raises constitutional questions.13 In ad-
dition, the possibility that the publisher is being
deterred from informing the public regarding the
offender's views must be analyzed.' 4 Finally, even
if the statute does interfere with the offender telling
his story, such interference may be constitutional
if the restrictions are not content-based and the
statute's purpose is not solely to prevent the of-
fender from telling his story."
EVIDENCE OF DETERRENCE
The first amendment fully protects an offender's
right to tell the circumstances surrounding the
commission of his crime or to tell his thoughts and
feelings about the crime. The fact that the subject
matter of the speech may include offensive details
to perfect and enforce the lien created by this section.
Bracketed language substituted by the division of
statutory revision for "expiration."
FLA. STAT. § 944.512 (Supp. 1979).
The Department of Legal Affairs shall be the legal
advisor of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation.
FLA. STAT. § 944.52 (Supp. 1979).
,1 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 17-49 and accompanying text supra.
1a See notes 50-78 and accompanying text supra.
14 See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
15 See notes 86-125 and accompanying text supra.
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of an infamous crime is inconsequential. The Su-
preme Court has emphatically stated that "the
Constitution protects expression and association
without regard to... the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."'
6
The proper starting point for an analysis of the
constitutionality of the New York and Florida
statutes is to determine whether they deter the
offender from telling about his offense. Neither
statute directly prohibits an offender from telling
the story of his crime.'7 However, the first amend-
ment also prohibits indirect governmental interfer-
ence with protected speech. "Freedoms such as
these are protected not only against heavy-handed
frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more
subtle governmental interference."'
8
16 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) ("debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open. ) and Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (.1961) (indicating that
unprotected speech includes, "libel, slander, misrepresen-
tation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of
crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy and the
like....") But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Justice Stevens, with the concurrence
of Burger, C.J. and Justices White and Rehnquist, con-
cluding that society's interest in protecting sexually ex-
plicit films, which are not obscene, "is of a wholly differ-
ent, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untram-
meled political debate...
17Cf First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts criminal statute prohibit-
ing corporations from expressing their views on referen-
dum questions if such issues are not directly related to
their business interests); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977) (community prohibited the posting of
"For Sale" signs); Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975) (statute prohibiting drive-in movie thea-
ters from showing films containing nudity); Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance
prohibiting non-labor picketing in the vicinity of a
school).
is Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). See,
e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
which found a license tax imposed on the owners of
newspapers having a circulation greater than 20,000
copies per week unconstitutional because it had "the
plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing
the circulation of a selected group of newspapers." Id. at
251. The Court stated:
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes
money from the pockets of the appellees. If that were
all, a wholly different question would be presented.
It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its
present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is
entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A
free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow
it to be fettered is to fetter our-selves.
Several of the provisions of the New York statute
clearly would reduce any profit-making incentive
for the offender to sell his story to a publisher. First,
the offender cannot get the funds for five years.
Instead, the funds which he would otherwise re-
ceive are remitted to the Crime Victims' Compen-
sation Board where they are held in escrow for a
minimum of five years.' 9 Although the funds are
paid over immediately to the offender if he is
acquitted of the charges against him,20 an acquittal
by reason of mental defect is considered a convic-
tion under the statute.2 ' If a court finds mental
defect, the statute requires the Board to bring an
interpleader action to determine the disposition of
the escrow account.22
Not only does the statute deprive the offender of
the money for five years, it also allows the state to
deplete the funds during the escrow period by
using them to pay victims. The statute provides
that victims may bring civil suits, generally tort
actions, 3 in courts of competent jurisdiction. Dur-
ing this period these actions can be brought even
if the original statute of limitations has expired on
the causes of action.24 The possibility of a victim
Id. at 250. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181
(1972) (infringement of first amendment to deny Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society chapter recognition as a
campus organization); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a municipal
tax on door-to-door solicitation as applied to evangelists
distributing literature). Cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 693-95 (1972) (upheld requirement that newspaper
reporter respond to grand jury subpoena despite potential
deterrence of source of information).
i9 N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1979) at
§ 1. The escrow period could be longer than five years if
a victim brings a civil action which is still pending at the
end of the five year period. Id. at § 4.
2 Id. at § 3.
2i Id. at § 5.22 Id. at § 6.
2 See, eg., Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 414
N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979).
2' N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a(7) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
It is not clear from the statute whether a victim of the
same offender can bring an action to recover from the
proceeds of the story of a crime other than the one during
which he was injured. In Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d
604, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979), the court held, inter alia,
that this statute creates a new in rem cause of action with
its own statute of limitations running for five years from
the creation of the escrow account. It concluded that
because the civil judgment will not be in personam, the
recovery under the new cause of action is limited to the
extent of the funds in the escrow account and the victim
cannot use that judgment to recover other assets of the
offender. The court also recognized that one of the central
premises of the statute is that the victim bears a special
relation to the funds because he was the victim of the
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bringing suit within the five-year period, thereby
dissipating the funds, is enhanced by the statutory
requirements that the Board regularly publicize
the availability of the escrow funds.25 Thus, these
provisions have a tendency to deter an offender
from selling the story of his crime to a publisher by
withholding the proceeds of that arrangement for
at least five years and by maximizing the proba-
bility that the funds will be expended by the end
of that period.
However, the New York statute also offers incen-
tives for the offender to sell his story. For example,
the offender may use the escrow account to pay
reasonable attorneys' fees.26 Because the typical
indigent defendant would prefer private counsel
over publicly appointed counsel, the statute en-
courages him to tell his story. Studies have shown
that such an indigent defendant is not likely to
trust the public defender because he believes the
defender is an agent of the state. The defendant
perceives that paying for a private lawyer secures
several benefits. It provides a lawyer who is "on his
side;" he has greater control in the relationship
than that of a supplicant; the lawyer will be more
knowledgeable about the criminal law and will
have better legal skills in general.2s Therefore, even
if the criminal never receives any personal profit,
the statute still provides all the perceived benefits
of having retained private counsel rather than
appointed counsel or a public defender.2
crime which indirectly generated the proceeds. "It would
be ironic to hold that a victim who may have been killed,
maimed, or otherwise injured is to be left remediless while
the felon could reap the 'fall-out' rewards of the victim's
injuries." Id. at 615, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 357. Victims of
other crimes committed by the offender do not bear the
special relation to the proceeds and should not be entitled
to the benefit of the statute under the rationale of the
court in Barrett.
25 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney Supp.
1979).2
6Id. at § 8.
2J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DE-
FENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 107 (1972). This study found that,
"[n]early 80 percent of those represented by public de-
fenders felt that their lawyer was not on their side. All
those who had private attorneys felt that their lawyer
was on their side." Id. at 105-06. Another study reported:
"Retained counsel generally are considered to be superior
to both assigned counsel and public defenders. On
twenty-three of the twenty-four lawyering values rated
by the inmates, retained counsel received the highest
score." O'Brien, Pheterson, Wright, & Hostica, The Crim-
inal Lawyer: The Defendant's Perspective, 5 AM. J. CRiM. L.
283, 299 (1977).
28Id.
2 In none of the reported cases of criminals selling the
stories of their crimes does the offender actually write a
The New York statute also encourages a nonin-
digent defendant to sell the rights to his story. He
is likely to feel that the more money he can expend,
for representation, the better lawyer he can employ.
If he already has a lawyer, the funds will provide
better representation since he can pay the attorney
to spend more time on his case, conduct more
research, and hire expert support which he may
not otherwise be able to afford. A lawyer is never
allowed to take a direct interest in publication
rights as payment for his services.s° Under the New
York statute, however, he is likely to encourage his
client to enter into such an agreement to generate
an escrow fund account to be used for better
representation.
31
story or article. He at most submits to one or more
interviews. More frequently, he just allows a writer to be
present during the preparation and presentation of his
defense or waives any rights which he may have to the
dramatization of his offense. See note 2 supra.
3 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR5-
104(B), reads:
Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving
rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into
any arrangement or understanding with a client or
a prospective client by which he acquires an interest
in publication rights with respect to the subject
matter of his employment or proposed employment.
In Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 101 Cal. App. 736, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1980) the court upheld a trial court order removing
the lawyers retained by the defendant. The retainer
agreement had provided for assignment of all lite'r-
ary rights to the life story of the defendant murder
suspect in return for legal representation. The court
found that, "[t]he conflict of interest that arises from
the fee-interest potential of the retainer agreement
here is so inherently conducive to divided loyalties
as to amount to a denial of the right to effective
representation as a matter of law." Id.
Similarly, in People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d
684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978), the court reversed
the conviction of accused mass murderer Juan Cor-
ona on the grounds, inter alia, that he was denied
effective counsel because his trial counsel had se-
cured the literary and dramatic rights to his client's
story as compensation. But see Ray v. Rose, 535 F.2d
966 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976)
(requiring a showing of some actual prejudice before
finding denial of effective counsel due to potential
conflict of interest situation).
3I However, it was held in People v. Berkowitz, 97
Misc. 2d 277, 411 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1978), that if there has
been an agreement between the defendant and the attor-
ney for a fixed fee and the defendant cannot pay it
because of a failure of the literary rights to produce the
expected proceeds, the attorney cannot then seek ap-
pointment as his counsel by the state. This case ironically
involved the same defendant whose potential profiteering
spurred the passage of the New York act.
Even the defendant who can afford a good law-
yer will want to sell his story because he can use
the literary proceeds to pay his attorney.3 2 This is
particularly true if the defendant has property or
income which is exempt from tort judgments but
which he would otherwise need to pay his legal
fees.
33
Experience shows that offenders will contract for
their stories in order to pay legal fees. In all of the
reported cases of offenders selling or assigning the
rights to the story of their crimes, the proceeds were
applied in whole or in part to the payment of legal
fees.3 Such a longstanding relationship between
literary proceeds and attorneys' fees is likely to
continue in the foreseeable future.
The other inducement for the offender to con-
tract for the rights to his story under the New York
statute is to receive whatever funds remain in the
escrow account at the close of the statutory period
or upon acquittal.35 Because of these provisions,
the offender will not necessarily forfeit all of the
funds.3 6 He is encouraged to enter into the most
lucrative agreement possible since the marginal
funds produced will be returned to him.
However, since most criminals are not paid enor-
mous sums for their stories, in most if not all
situations, the payments to victims will exhaust the
funds before the five-year period is completed. The
stories which are published involve enough tortious
32 Of the states which have passed statutes modeled on
the New York act, only Alaska has interposed the addi-
tional requirement in paying his legal fees that the of-
fender have "insufficient assets, other than funds in the
escrow account, and assets which could be claimed as
exempt from execution under state law, to provide for
payment of expenses of legal representation." ALASKA
STAT. § 18.67.165 (Supp. 1975).
3 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5205 (McKinney 1979)
("Personal property exempt from the satisfaction of
money judgments").
34 See note 2 supra.
' N.Y. Exac. LAW § 632-a(3), (4) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
36 Such a forfeiture is effected by the variation of the
N.Y. statute adopted in Arizona which pays over any
remaining money to the state general fund. ARIZ. REy.
STAT. § 13-4202 (Supp. 1979). The Georgia statute is
contradictory as to the ultimate disposition of any funds
remaining in the escrow account at the conclusion of the
statutory period. Subsection (0 provides for a refund to
a convicted person if no actions are pending against him
after five years and subsection (i) mandates payment into
the state treasury of any excess remaining in the escrow
account or deposited into it after all money judgments
have been satisfied as compensation for the establish-
ment, administration, and execution of the provisions of
the statute.
conduct to exhaust these payments completely,
37
even when the amounts received are substantial. 3s
The opportunity to provide restitution also may
provide offenders with an incentive to tell their
stories. Often the offender desires to compensate
his victims for the injuries he has caused them.
According to a study of inmates in Florida correc-
tional institutions, "the overwhelming majority of
those who have committed a form of criminal
homicide also wish that they could make some
reparation. ' 39 This desire decreases as the serious-
ness of the crime drops to aggravated assault,
robbery, and burglary.4 0 The sale of the rights to
the story of his crime provides an opportunity for
the offender to provide restitution to his victims
with little effort on his own part. As a result, even
the restitution feature of the New York statute may
provide offenders with an incentive to contract.
Thus, the New York statute, while creating sev-
eral disincentives for the offender to sell the story
of his crime, retains distinct incentives. These in-
centives include the use of the funds for the pay-
ment of attorneys' fees, the possibility of receiving
any funds remaining in the account at the conclu-
sion of the escrow period, and the opportunity to
provide restitution to the offender's victims.
Whether these incentives outweigh the disincen-
tives depends upon the individual offender.
The differing provisions of the Florida statute do
not clearly result in any greater net disincentive.
By placing a statutory lien on the proceeds the
Florida statute creates a disincentive similar to that
of the New York statute. Furthermore, while the
New York act remits any remaining funds to the
offender after five years,41 the Florida legislation
withholds these proceeds until the offender's release
or parole,42 generally a considerably longer period.
37 For example, of the documented cases discussed in
note 2 supra, only John Wojtowicz was not accused of one
or more murders. Even this crime, the holding of several
hostages for a period of several hours, also may have
caused enough tortious injuries to exhaust the $43,000 in
the escrow account.
"8 To date almost all the amounts reportedly received
have been in the five-figure range. See note 2 supra.
a3 Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correc-
tional Aim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REv. 243, 251 (1965).
This conclusion is supported by the reported request of
convicted murderer Gary Gilmore before his execution
that the proceeds from any books about his story should
be distributed to the families of his victims. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1977, at 21 col. 4.
0 Schafer, supra note 39. The offender also may desire
to sell his story to pay tort judgments.
' N.Y. Exac. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
42 FLA. STAT. § 944.512(2)(d) (Supp. 1979).
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In addition, the Florida statute eliminates the
major incentive of the New York act by failing to
provide payment of attorneys' fees out of the liter-
ary proceeds. The impact of this omission is not as
great as it appears on its face. Unlike the New York
act under which the state confiscates the proceeds
of both the accused and the convicted offender,
43
the Florida statute only mandates confiscation of
proceeds payable to a convicted felon." Because
the Florida act fails to confiscate any funds payable
to the offender before his conviction, an accused
felon may sell his story to pay his legal expenses
prior to conviction. In fact, the publicity surround-
ing the offender's apprehension and prosecution is
likely to make the time prior to conviction the most
profitable time for him to sell his story.
The Florida statute reduces the other incentives
provided under the New York act. The New York
act provides that the offender will receive all of the
proceeds if no victims bring claims,45 but the Flor-
ida provisions guarantee that up to 50% of the
funds will be used to compensate the state for its
costs in prosecuting and incarcerating the of-
fender.46 In addition, the Florida statute requires
that 25% of the funds go to the offender's depen-
dents.47 The victims' claims are limited to a maxi-
mum of 25% of the funds.4 Once the victims, the
state, and the dependents are paid, the offender in
Florida is less likely to profit from the agreement
than is an offender subject to the New York statute.
Nevertheless, the Florida act does provide incen-
tives for the offender to sell his story. Most signifi-
cantly, it distributes 25% of the proceeds to the
offender's dependents. Because he has no other
opportunity to provide support for his family, the
convicted felon can benefit them only by selling his
story. For example, in 1969, Susan Atkins, an
alleged accomplice in the Tate-LaBianca murder
case, granted an exclusive interview to an entrepre-
neur who sold her story to a number of newspapers
around the world. Atkins provided that her 45%
share of the $175,000 gross profits be put in trust
for the benefit of her son.49
The Florida statute does not foreclose the possi-
bility of the offender directly receiving some of the
profits from his story. Under its provisions, the
43 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(I).
44 FLA. STAT. § 944.512(1).
4 N.Y. Ex~c. LAw 632-a(4).4 6 FLA. STAT. § 944.512(2).47 Id. at § 944.512(2)(b).
4id.
49 See note 2 supra.
victims' share of the proceeds is limited to 25%. If
the restitution owed to the state does not consume
the remaining fifty percent of the funds, the state
will pay the residue to the offender upon his release.
The interaction of these two provisions means that
an offender can obtain some of the literary proceeds
under the Florida statute even though the victims'
claims would have completely consumed the funds
under the New York act.
Like New York, Florida presents the possibility
that the offender will contract for his story out of
a desire to recompense his victims. This incentive
may be limited because the maximum benefit to
victims is one-quarter of the total revenues. Most
offenders, however, probably dislike seeing the
state compensated for its expenses in prosecuting
and incarcerating them.
Thus, while the major incentive under the New
York act is the availability of the proceeds for the
payment of attorneys' fees, the primary incentive
in Florida is the guaranteed distribution of one-
quarter of the funds to the offender's dependents.
Again, the balancing involved depends on the
individual offender, but the Florida statute pro-
vides significant incentives for the offender to sell
his story which may outweigh the disincentives.
REMOVAL OF THE PROFIT MOTIVE
Even if the statutes deter the offender from
selling his story, this does not necessarily mean that
they unconstitutionally burden his expression of
protected speech. Since the statutes only affect the
profits from the sale of his story, they arguably do
not infringe on either the offender's right to speak
or the public's right to know.
The argument that the statutes violate the first
amendment because they deter the offender from
publishing the story of his crime centers on the
withdrawal of the proceeds as the source of the
deterrent effect. This does not, however, allege the
affirmative assertion of a barrier to his expression
but rather involves the withdrawal of an incentive
for him to express himself. The publishers who are
willing to pay him for his story would be equally
if not more willing to accept his statements free of
charge. The payments to the offender induce him
to tell his story but do not relate to the willingness
of publishers to print it. The Court has stated that
"[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing
speaker. ' 5° The argument against these statutes
'oVirginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
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seems to presuppose an unwilling speaker who must
be induced to communicate by monetary pay-
ments. The mere removal of this inducement
should not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.
The Court has repeatedly shown greater willing-
ness to accept government regulations which only
restrict profit-motivated speech. For example, in
Breard v. Alexandria5" the Court upheld a local
"Green River ordinance" prohibiting the door-to-
door solicitation of magazine subscriptions. While
recognizing that the distribution of periodicals is
protected by the first amendment, the Court con-
cluded that, "[t]he selling, however, brings into the
transaction a commercial feature., 52 This commer-
cial aspect distinguished Breard from the earlier
case of Martin v. Struthers,53 in which the Court
invalidated a statute prohibiting Jehovah's Wit-
nesses from the door-to-door distribution of leaflets
advertising a religious meeting. The Court in Breard
specifically noted that, "no element of the com-
mercial entered into this free solicitation ... [in
Martin]."54 In this way, Breard clearly demonstrates
the Court's reduced concern for commercial speech
vis-a-vis other protected activities.55
More recently, in In re Primus,56 the Court reit-
erated the distinction for first amendment purposes
between profit motivated speech and speech which
seeks to advance beliefs and ideas. In that case, an
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney
was charged with solicitation for offering to repre-
sent without charge a woman who had been steri-
lized as a condition to her receipt of public assist-
ance funds. The Court contrasted the situation of
the attorney in Primus with that of the appellant in
s 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
52 Id. at 642.
" 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
341 U.S. at 643.
5 According to Professor Redish: "[Tihe opinion (in
Breard) ... demonstrates the Court's general lack of en-
thusiasm for the commercial element in first amendment
questions. This is so even where that lack of enthusiasm
is in no way justified by the nature of the communication
for which protection is sought." Redish, The First Amend-
ment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 454-57
(1971). The Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Vir-
ginia Consumer Council noted that, "Islince the decision
in Breard... the Court has never denied protection on
the ground that the speech in issue was 'commercial
speech.'" 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1975). However, this dis-
tinction does not conflict with the conclusion that the
extent of protection is reduced when commercial interests
are the subject of the regulation. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
5436 U.S. 412 (1978).
the companion case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association.57 The attorney in Ohralik had been
charged with illegally offering to represent the
victims of an automobile accident for his personal
gain. The Primus Court held that the activities of
the ACLU lawyer constituted expressive and asso-
ciational conduct which were fully protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments.M The Court
noted that ACLU sponsorship of litigation is not
motivated by considerations of pecuniary gain but
rather, "by its widely recognized goal of vindicat-
ing civil liberties."5 9 The Court distinguished Ohr-
alik because there the attorney was motivated solely
by the desire for financial gain.6° This motivation-
based distinction was justified in a footnote which
stated that:
"[n]ormally the purpose or motive of the speaker is
not central to First Amendment protection, but it
does bear on the distinction between conduct that
is 'an associational aspect of "expression"..., and
other activity subject to plenary regulation by gov-
ernment.... The line, based in part on the motive
of the speaker and the character of the expressive
activity, will not always be easy to draw ..., but
that is no reason for avoiding the undertaking. 61
The Primus and Ohralik decisions demonstrate
that the Supreme Court continues to accord com-
mercial speech less protection than other forms of
speech.'
One critic of the New York statute, however,
analogizes63 it to a Louisiana statute which was
held unconstitutional in Grosjean v. American Press
Co.6 The Invalid statute in that case taxed the
gross receipts of any newspaper or periodical with
a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
The tax violated the first amendment because it
had "the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers
and curtailing the circulation of a selected group
of newspapers."' The unconstitutional restraints
.7 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
436 U.S. at 432.
59 Id. at 430.
6 Id. at 422. See also id. at 438n.32 ("the lawyer [in
Ohralik] was not engaged in associational activity for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas; his purpose was the
advancement of his own commercial interests.").
'61 Id. at 438n.32 (citations omitted).
6 See note 55 supra and Farber, Commercial Speech and
First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. L. REv. 372, 406 (1979).
See also J. NOWAK, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrtiONAL LAW
770 (1978).
6 See Compensating the Victim, supra note 7, at 106.
6 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
6 Id. at 251. Professor Redish states:
At the time of the Louisiana Legislature's action,
Governor Huey Long effectively controlled the leg-
islative as well as executive branches. It was gener-
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in Grosjean were the reduction of the amount of
advertising revenues and the tendency to restrict
circulation.66 These restraints seem to be analogous
to the effect of the New York statute in reducing
the offender's revenues and the tendency of the
offender to want to sell his story.
While this comparison is attractive, it is mis-
placed. The newspaper depends upon its advertis-
ing revenues and its circulation for its existence. A
reduction in its revenues causes deficits and may
put the paper out of business.67 By contrast, the
channels of communciation offered by publishers
remain even if the offender's profit is withdrawn.
A better analogy, showing the nominal impact
of the statutes in withdrawing the profit motive,
can be drawn from Branzburg v. Hayes.68 In that
case, the Court held that a newspaper reporter is
subject to grandjury subpoena despite his assertion
that such a ruling will discourage informants from
communicating with him. The Court found that
estimates of the impact of such subpoenas on the
willingness of informants to make disclosures were
"widely divergent and to a great extent specula-
tive."Oss In fact such inhibition was considered un-
likely since "quite often, such informants are mem-
bers of a minority political or cultural group that
relies heavily on the media to propagate its views,
publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the
public." 70 Similarly, the offender must rely on the
publisher to communicate his story to the public.
The argument that any deterrent effect of the
New York and Florida statutes is constitutionally
irrelevant because it is based on the mere with-
drawal of a profit motive is less effective against an
asserted violation of the public's right to know.
ally known that the larger papers had been by far
the more critical of the Long administration. Al-
though the Court never detailed these facts in its
opinion, it did note that the form of the tax was
suspicious in its emphasis upon the circulation level,
concluding that the plain legislative intent was to
curtail the circulation of a selected group of news-
papers.
Redish, supra note 55, at 456-57.
297 U.S. at 244-45.
67 However, the Court explicitly noted that,
[i]t is not intended by anything we have said to
suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune
from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for sup-
port of the government. But this is not an ordinary
form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long
history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the
press.
Id. at 250.
65408 U.S. 665 (1971).
69 Id. at 693-94. See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 566 (1978).70 Id. at 694-95.
Under the right to know doctrine, the right of
members of the public to receive information and
ideas is independent of the right of the speaker to
communicate those ideas.7' For example, in Klein-
dienst v. Mandel72 the Court held that university
professors had standing on first amendment
grounds to challenge the denial of an entry visa to
a foreign journalist whom they had invited to speak
at universities and other forums in the United
States.73 The Court recognized this right despite
the appellees' concession that thejournalist himself
could assert no constitutional rights.74 Similarly, in
Procunier v. Martinez5 the Court *did not consider
the rights of prisoners to claim first amendment
freedom against censorship of their mail, because
it concluded that such actions also infringed upon
the noninmate addressees' rights to know.76 The
right to know doctrine thus gives recipients of
communications a right to object to any barrier
between the speaker and themselves, regardless of
the speaker's inability to challenge the infringe-
ment.
The right to know doctrine requires an objective
analysis of whether the statutes deter the speaker
from communicating. The offender's right to object
to such a deterrent effect is irrelevant in determin-
ing the presence of such a deterrent effect.
The analysis of the profit-making element can
be split into two parts. One aspect is the lower level
of concern shown by the Court for restrictions on
the commercial aspects of otherwise protected
speech. This argument relates to whether the of-
fender can legally object to such a deterrence be-
cause only his profits are involved. The public's
right to know should not be subject to this objection
if the withdrawal of the profits effects a real deter-
rence to the offender.
An assertion of the public's right to know is,
however, susceptible to the objection already raised
7' Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
72 Id.
73 The Court ultimately held that Congress' "plenary
power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to
exclude those who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden," cannot be overridden by first
amendment considerations. Id. at 766 (quoting Boutilier
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118,
123 (1967).
74 Id. at 762.
76416 U.S. 396 (1974).
76 Id. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
gihia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756-57 (1976) (holding that consumers of prescription
drugs had standing to challenge a statute prohibiting
price advertising of prescription drugs); Note, The Right
to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 Trax. L. REv. 505
(1979).
1980]
that, "[flreedom of speech presupposes a willing
speaker." 77 If the withdrawal of an affirmative
inducement to speak, here the payment of money,
is the only deterrence alleged, it suggests that the
speaker is not in fact a "willing speaker" who is
being prevented from speaking. A strong argument
can be made that the channels of communication
remain freely available to the offender who wishes
to express his thoughts or feelings.78 The right to
know only asserts the right not to have a barrier
placed between the source and the recipient of the
communication. If there is no barrier, it follows
that the recipient has no basis to challenge the
government's actions.
DETERRENCE OF THE PUBLISHERS
It also is argued that the public's right to know
is infringed by the tendency of the New York
statute to discourage publishers from entering into
contracts which may be subject to the provisions of
the statute. A disincentive allegedly results because
the publisher must follow the statute, and he will
fear that he will be liable if he pays the funds to
the wrong party.79 The statute itself, however, re-
futes the argument that the statute burdens the
publisher. The New York act only obligates the
publisher to pay funds which he owes under a
contract to the Crime Victims' Compensation
Board rather than to the offender. Presumably, if
he is willing to pay an offender for his story, this
burden will not deter him from that action.
The publisher also need not fear that he will be
subject to double liability for paying an offender
when he should have paid the funds to the Board
or for paying the Board when he should have paid
the offender. Such an argument depends upon the
statute being vague. The statute, however, is very
specific. It is limited to situations in which two
easily observable conditions are met. First, the
publisher must be contracting for the reenactment
of a crime or the expressions of an accused or
convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or
emotions regarding the crime. Second, the contract
must provide for payment to the offender who is
charged or convicted of committing the crime
which is the subject of the reenactment or expres-
sions, or his representative or assignee.80 Similarly,
the Florida statute only places a lien upon pay-
ments to a convicted felon or anyone on his behalf
77 425 U.S. at 756.
78 See text accompanying notes 17-49 supra.
7 See Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 7, at 454-55.
" N. Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (1) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
for any accounts of the crime for which he -was
convicted.8' A publisher should know when he is
buying the story of a crime directly or indirectly
from the perpetrator of that offense.
The consequences to a publisher for improperly
paying the proceeds to the offender are not stated
in the New York act.82 Florida law, however, pro-
vides that disposal of property which is subject to
a statutory lien without the written consent of the
lien holder, the state in this case, constitutes a
misdemeanor of the first degree.H The maximum
penalty for such an offense is one year in jail and
a $1,000 fine.84 Therefore if the publisher has any
doubt as to the applicability of the statute to a
particular contract, he could withhold the funds
and contact the Department of Legal Affairs for
either authorization to release them or to com-
mence legal proceedings to perfect the lien.
8 5
CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
If it is found that the statutes do deter the
offender from publishing the story of his crime or
his thoughts and feelings about it, there are two
tests which can be applied to invalidate them
under the first amendment. The first test questions
whether the statutes impose a content-based restric-
tion. Instead of attaching the profits from all com-
munications by the offender, the New York and
Florida statutes are limited in scope to those which
flow from the story of his crime. By doing this, the
statutes treat one class of publication differently
because of its subject matter. The Court has criti-
cized content-based classifications, reasoning that,
81 FLA. STAT. § 944.512 (1) (Supp. 1979).
2 While the New York statute does not define the
publisher's liability for wrongly paying the proceeds over
to the Board, he will presumably be liable to the extent
of the funds which should have been paid over. See, e.g.,
Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 7, at 454.
Other states which have adopted statutes modeled on
the New York act have, however, provided sanctions for
the failure of the publisher to pay the proceeds to the
state. In Georgia, the contracting party is guilty of a
misdemeanor for each day he violates the statute by
failing to pay over the proceeds to the Board of Offender
Rehabilitation. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401(c) (Rev. 1979).
Illinois makes the failure to abide by the statutory re-
quirements a business offense punishable by a fine of no
less than $5,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 § 409 (Supp.
1979). Finally, Arizona provides the same sanction which
is presumed to exist under the New York act: liability to
the state to the extent of the monies which should have
been remitted to the State Industrial Commission under
the statute. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-4202 (L) (Supp. 1979).
83 FLA. STAT.§ 818.01 (1976).
84 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 775.083 (1976).5 FLA. STAT. § 944.512 (Supp. 1979).
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"any restriction on expressive activity because of
its content would completely undercut the pro-
found national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open." 86 For this reason, the
Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley8 7
invalidated a Chicago ordinance which prohibited
all peaceful picketing near schools, except labor
picketing. The Court explained, "[s]elective exclu-
sions from a public forum may not be based on
content alone, and may not be justified by refer-
ence to content alone."
88
Although the Court in Mosley vehemently at-
tacked content-based classifications, there are two
ways in which the statutes can survive scrutiny as
content-based restrictions. First, the basis of the
Mosley rule is that expression on one subject is
restricted, while expression on other subjects is
permitted. Therefore, to find the statutes unconsti-
tutional under Mosley, one must first show that
some speech is excluded from the public forum on
the basis of its content. In fact, the statutes allow
the offender to express his thoughts and feelings
about his crime. The Mosley rule has thus far only
been applied to situations in which a direct prohi-
bition of protected speech is involved. For example,
in Mosley, the Court found the statute unconstitu-
tional because it excluded certain expressive activity
from a public forum on the basis of content alone
by making that activity illegal.9 The freedom of
the offender to tell the story of his crime under the
instant statutes eliminates any Mosley-based objec-
tion.
Another argument in favor of the statutes is that
they are unrelated to the viewpoint taken by the
offender. Thus, even if they are content-based, they
are still viewpoint neutral. The statutes could at-
tach only the profits from publications in which
the offender expresses no remorse for his actions.
However, they apply to all publications involving
the story of the offender's crime regardless of the
viewpoint which he expresses. In Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights,9° the Court held in a five-to-four
decision that a city could constitutionally prohibit
political or public issue advertisements from its
buses. A plurality of the Court noted that, during
the prior twenty-six years of service, no political or
8 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).87 id.
m Id. at 96.
89 Id. at 92-93.
90 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
public service advertising had ever been permit-
ted.91 The Court further observed that, "[h]ere, the
city has decided that '[p]urveyors of goods and
services saleable in commerce may purchase adver-
tising space on an equal basis, whether they be
house builders or butchers."' 9 2 Despite its previous
strong statement against all restrictions based on
content, 93 the Court in Lehman upheld a content-
discriminating statute in part because the statute
treated those within the classes equally.94 Similarly,
in Greer v. Spock,"5 the Court upheld a prohibition
of partisan political activities on a military post
because the policy was, "objectively and evenhand-
edly applied" and did not discriminate among
candidates for public office based upon the candi-
date's political views.
96
Like the rules in Lehman and Greer, the New York
and Florida statutes are free from content-based
criticism because they are not concerned with the
specific viewpoint which the offender takes in the
publication. The statutes distribute the profits from
the stories regardless of whether the stories express
remorse or obduracy for the offenses.
TEST OF PURPOSE
Even if the statutes deter the offender from
communicating the story of his crime they are not
automatically unconstitutional. One must next de-
termine whether they attempt directly to restrict
the expression of an offender's views regarding his
crime or whether the infringement indirectly results
from an attempt to affect some other activity.
9 7
9i Justice Blackmun's opinion for the plurality was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Rehnquist; Justice Douglas, the fifth vote, wrote a sepa-
rate opinion concurring on the ground that the riders
constitute a captive audience justifying the rule. Id.
2 Id. at 303-34 (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 34 Ohio 2d 143, 196, 296 N.E.2d 683, 688
(1973)).
9aThe dissenting opinion reasoned that the city, by
accepting any advertising on buses, had created a public
forum for communication, and once that was done, "both
free speech and equal protection principles prohibit dis-
crimination based solely upon subject matter or content."
Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
9 See also Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content:
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L.
REv. 81, 91 (1978).95 424 U.S. 828-29 (1976).
96 Id. at 838-39.
97 [G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control
the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfet-
tered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of
law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade
Congress or the States to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental
interests, a pre-requisite to constitutionality which
Infringement directed at the speech itself is pre-
sumed to be unconstitutional, and the government
can overcome this presumption only by "showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling" for
suppressing that speech.98 The determination of
whether an infringement is primarily intended to
restrict the expression of speech may be made by
analyzing the statute on its face to determine
whether "any other purpose could be involved"
and by inquiring into the intent of the legislature. 9
The face of the New York statute shows its
primary purpose to be unrelated to the abridgment
of the offender's right to express himself on the
subject of his crime. The act primarily prevents the
offender from avoiding liability to his victims for
the physical injuries which he has inflicted. In
has necessarily involved a weighting of the govern-
mental interest involved.
Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-
51 (1961) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958), and TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580 (1978).
This is actually a search for the third of the four
requirements established in United States v. O'Brien for
the justification of a regulation having a collateral effect
upon free speech, the furtherance of a' governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See notes 100-102 and accom-
panying text infra.
98 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 786 (1978) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960)).
99 Supreme Court precedents are unclear about the
role of legislative intent in this type of analysis. In United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court osten-
sibly refused to consider the legislative intent behind a
law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards. The Court
stated that, "[iut is a familiar principle of constitutional
law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive." Id. at 383. Despite this admonition,
the Court went ahead in O'Brien and considered the
legislative motivation finding no illicit intent was evi-
denced. Id. at 385-86. See also TRIBE, supra note 97, at
594.
The refusal to consider legislative motivation in O'Brien
was later contradicted in Washington v. Davis where
Justic White stated for the majority: "To the extent that
some of our cases suggest a generally applicable propo-
sition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitu-
tional adjudication, our prior cases.., are to the con-
trary." 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976). The difference may
be one of quantity and quality of proof. Professor Tribe
concluded that, "[i]f there is persuasive proof that a
purpose to penalize or control rights of expression or
association was a motivating factor in the enactment of
a law, such proof should.., trigger the demand for an
extraordinary justification of the government's departure
from neutrality." TRIBE, supra note 97, at 598.
doing this, the statute isolates the proceeds from
the story of the crime since they result from the
crime in which the victim was injured. The victim
can then receive restitution from these funds for his
injuries no matter how long the offender waits
before "earning" them. Without such an avoidance
mechanism, the victim would have to bring a tort
action within a one or three year statute of limita-
tions.'0° Only a wrongful death action is not subject
to any statute of limitations.'0 1 In many situations
the victim cannot ascertain within the necessary
time whether he should undergo the time, expense,
and mental strain of a tort action against an other-
wise impecunious and "judgment proof" offender
merely on the remote possibility that the offender
may one day sell his memoirs.
10 2
The statute also prevents the offender from dis-
sipating the proceeds before the vicim can com-
mence a timely action and secure court jurisdiction
over the funds. The concern is that the offender
will sell his story and spend or give away the money
before the victim, who presumed his attacker was
judgment proof, learns about the contractual ar-
rangement. The New York act prevents this dissi-
pation by requiring the publisher to pay the pro-
ceeds directly to the Board.' °3
'00The following actions shall be commenced
within one year:
3. an action to recover damages for assault, battery,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel,
slander, false words causing special damages, or a
violation of the right to privacy under section fifty-
one of the civil rights law;...."
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 215 (McKinney 1979).
The following actions must be commenced within
three years:
2. an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or
forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as
provided in sections 213 and 215;
5. an action to recover damages for a personal injury
except as provided in section 215.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1979).
0i "The right of action now existing to recover dam-
ages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abro-
gated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject
to any statutory limitation." N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
'02 Clearly it is not for lack of merit that the victim of
a crime does not at once sue for the tortious injury. In
fact the criminal conviction would be conclusive proof of
most of the elements necessary to recover on an analo-
guous claim in tort. The obvious reason that a victim
ordinarily withholds suit is that he believes that the
defendant is indigent, so that the expenditure of the time
and money involved in a civil litigation would be of no
avail. Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 614-15, 411
N.Y.S.2d 350, 356-357.
'03 Arguably, however, the New York statute is unnec-
essary because prior New York law already prevents the
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The New York statute represents a significant
improvement over prior state law and evidences
the statute's anti-avoidance goals. Under preexist-
ing New York law, a victim who recovered a tort
judgment was not assured that the offender would
not legally escape liability to him for the proceeds
of the story of his crime. The victim could only
enforce that judgment for twenty years. At the end
of the twenty years the state irrebuttably presumed
that the offender/judgment debtor had satisfied
the judgment unless he acknowledged his indebt-
edness in writing or made a payment during that
period. In the latter circumstances, the twenty
years are measured from the date of acknowledg-
offender from avoiding liability in this way. Section 5202
of the New York Civil Practice Law grants a judgment
creditor a limited priority over transferees of any debt or
property against which a judgment may be enforced.
N.Y. Cxv. PRc. LAW § 5202 (McKinney 1979). Also,
sections 276 and 278 of the Debtor Creditor Law give a
judgment creditor the right to set aside conveyances
made for other than fair consideration and meant to
defraud future creditors. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276
(McKinney 1979). See generally §§1 270-281. Under either
of these provisions, the victim holding a tort judgment
could recover funds from transferees of the offender who
did not give fair consideration for them. If the transferee
did give fair consideration the victim could satisfy his
judgment from the property given to the offender as
consideration.
While these provisions provide some protection, the
new provisions are more extensive. For example, the new
act avoids any chance that an unidentifiable transferee
receives the money or that an identified one dissipates it.
In addition, the prior law penalizes the offender who is
already subject to a heavy criminal sentence and there-
fore, likely to disobey the civil law freely. The new act,
subjects the publisher to liability, thereby ensuring ad-
herence to the provisions of the statute. See note 64 supra.
The New York statute does not specify the liability of
a publisher for failure to comply with its requirements. It
is at least likely that he would remain liable to the Board
for the amount wrongly paid over to the offender. See,
e.g., Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 7, at 453-54.
Three states, Arizona, Georgia and Illinois, define the
penaltyfor the publisher's failure to abide by their man-
dates. See note 5 supra. In Georgia, the publisher is guilty
of a misdemeanor for each day he violates the statute by
failing to pay over the proceeds to the Board of Offender
Rehabilitation. It is the only state which provides a
criminal penalty. Illinois makes the failure to abide by
the statutory requirements a business offense punishable
by a fine of no less than $5,000. Id.
Arizona establishes that a publisher who fails to com-
ply with its statute is liable to the state to the extent of
the monies which should have been remitted to the State
Industrial Commission under the statute. This would also
be the extent of the liability which would arise in Idaho
where the statute specifically authorizes the Attorney
General or any other person to bring an action to require
the deposit of the proceeds into the escrow account. Id.
ment or payment.1°' Since an offender can, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, delay selling the story
of his crime until an unfulfilled judgment lapses,
the prior law can leave even a judgment-holding
victim remediless. For example, several people who
robbed the Boston office of Brink's Inc., of $1.5
million in cash and checks in 1950 cooperated in a
1977 book and 1978 film about their exploits.1on
Under prior New York law Brink's would be un-
able to satisfy any pre-1957 judgment from those
proceeds.
The New York statute therefore establishes sig-
nificantly improved methods of preventing avoid-
ance of liability by the offender to his victim. These
methods are tailored to the unique circumstances
of an impecunious offender who may at any time
sell the literary rights to the tale of his offense.
The public notice provisions also help prevent
the offender from avoiding liability by notifying
his victims of the availability of the funds.'06 These
provisions benefit both the victim who investigated
the offender's circumstances at the time of the
crime and found him to be judgment proof, and
the victim who holds an unsatisfied judgment but
would not otherwise be aware of the offender's
"windfall."
The statute also effectively prevents any one
victim or the offender's attorney from gaining an
improperly large share of the proceeds merely by
obtaining a prior judgment. Under the statute as
interpreted in Barrett v. Wojtowicz,i0 7 the funds in
the escrow account are for the benefit of all the
victims of the offender's crime and therefore, each
victim is only entitled to recover a pro rata share
of the funds if they are insufficient to fulfill all of
their claims. Similarly, the requirement that legal
fees be paid out of the fund only pursuant to a
court order limits the attorney to a reasonable fee.
This assures that the victim's interests in the funds
will be protected. If the statute was not in effect,
the attorney could obtain a judgment against the
'o' "A money judgment is presumed to be paid and
satisfied after the expiration of twenty years from the
time when the party recovering it was first entitled to
enforce it." N.Y. Civ. PPAc. LAW § 211(b) (McKinney
1979).
10 A Cool Million, TIME, Jan. 30, 1950 at 18; Gehn, Big
Stick-up at Brink's 1977; TiME, Dec. 11, 1978 at 109.
106 Under these provisions the Crime Victims Compen-
sation Board must advertise the availability of the escrow
account. See note 15 supra.
107 See note 24 supra. Provisions directly on this point
have been adopted in Georgia and Illinois. See note 4
supra.
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offender which would give him a priority over any
victims who obtain later judgments."ss
Finally, the statute adds further vitality to its
anti-avoidance goals by generally providing that
any actions taken by an offender to avoid appli-
cation of the statute, although not specifically an-
ticipated by it, are null and void as against the
public policy of the state.1l 9 For example, this
would prevent the offender from creating a corpo-
ration which would own the rights to his story and
in which third parties, perhaps his family members,
would be shareholders. This provision is supple-
mented by the statutory requirement that, in ad-
dition to paying over the proceeds, the publisher
must submit a copy of the contract." Thus the
state is able to 9crutinize the contract for any
sophisticated attempts to avoid liability in viola-
tion of the statute.
In examining the statute, it is important to
establish what purposes it does not seek to achieve.
Mistaking the purpose of the statute may lead to
the conclusion that the act does not achieve that
purpose and, consequently, has the effect of only
suppressing speech.
One critic contends that the purpose of the New
York statute is to secure compensation for innocent
victims of violent crimes,"' and that the general
Crime Victims Compensation Act" 2 more effec-
tively pursues this goal. Under the compensation
program, a victim may apply to the Board for
compensation from funds provided by the state.
The Board then determines whether an award
should be granted and the amount to be paid, up
to a $20,000 limit." 3 The victim may receive an
award even if the offender is never apprehended,
prosecuted, or convicted.1 4 By contrast, Section
632-a only pays a victim in the very rare circum-
stance when the convicted offender has been paid
for the story of the crime in which the victim was
injured.
108 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5234 (McKinney 1979)
(Distribution of proceeds of personal property; priorities).
The court in Barrett concluded that under the statute
the funds in the escrow account are for the benefit of all
the victims of the defendant's crime and, therefore, each
victim is only entitled to recovery of a pro rata share of
the amount. This result is not, however, clearly mandated
on the face of the statute.
"~ N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(9) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
"o Id. at 632-a (1).
"'. See Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 7, at 460-62.
"2 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 620 et. seq. (McKinney 1979).
This act was adopted 11 years before § 632-a.
1Id. at § 631(3).
"4 Id. at § 627(3).
The objectives of section 632-a differ from the
general crime victims compensation scheme. In-
stead of compensating all victims for their injuries,
the statute is limited to those cases in which the
offender would be unjustifiably enriched as a result
of the crime in which the victim- was injured. If a
victim already has received payments from the
state in compensation for his injuries, the state is
subrogated to his claims to the extent of those
payments." 5 Because the victim is limited under
the Crime Victims Compensation Act to a maxi-
mum of S20,000, it is possible that those funds will
not fully compensate him for his injuries and he
will need to look to the escrow account for the
difference. In this way the statute has the effect of
compensating the victim for his injuries. However,
the statute does not attempt to compensate victims
in general. The victim is allowed to raise his claims
to the escrow account, not out of legislative grace
as in the case of the compensation monies, but
through an equitable right to them as the victim
of the crime which generated them. In this way,
the statute is concerned with the special nature of
the funds being attached rather than the needs of
victims in general." 6
The conclusion that the purpose of the New
York statute is to ensure liability from the profits
which the offender indirectly receives from his
crime is confirmed by the legislative history which
is available on the act. Emmanuel Gold, the state
senator who authored the statute, stated in a leg-
islative memorandum that, "[t]his bill would make
it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the criminal. ' ' n 7
IS N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 634 (McKinney 1975).
11 Critics of the statute have suggested other purposes
for the statute. One which has been offered is an interest
in deterring the commission of crimes under a theory that
the possible revenues from the story of the crime may
encourage its perpetration. Another is a desire to punish
the offender for his offense by subjecting the profits to
the provisions of the statute. Neither of these purposes is
suggested either on the face of the statute or by its
legislative history. Admittedly, if either was the primary
purpose of the statute, its means could not be found
rationally related to them. See Criminals-Turned-Authors,
supra note 7, at 456-59.
i17 Memorandum of Emanuel R. Gold on S. 6923,
200th Sess. (1977), reprinted in NEW YORK STATE LEOIS-
LATIVE ANNUAL 267 (1977).
Similarly, in the adoption of a statute based on the
New York model in Illinois, Representative Hanrahan
stated, "[Tihe whole idea of the bill is... to insure the
fact that a victim of the crime has some recourse and
some compensation to pay medical bills and other kinds
of expenses that are brought about by the crime out of
that kind of publication." Proc. Ill. General Assembly,
House of Representatives, June 24, 1979.
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Thus, the intent was not to prevent the sale of the
offender's story but to assure the victim's rights to
those funds.
Although seeking other goals than the New York
act, the Florida act also does not intend primarily
to prevent the offender from expressing himself.
While it does allow a victim to receive payments
from the literary proceeds, it limits them to a
maximum of twenty-five percent of the total reve-
nues. It distributes twenty-five percent of the pro-
ceeds to the dependents of the offender, and retains
up to fifty percent of the money for the state for
the expenses of prosecuting and incarcerating the
offender."18 This redistribution suggests different
conclusions about the equitable rights of this unjust
enrichment. If the rationale for withholding the
funds is that the funds are an indirect result of the
crime and the victim therefore should be entitled
to them, one must ascertain the victim of the crime.
The Florida statute finds, as the New York statute
does, that the people who were injured by the
offender in the course of his crime are the victims
and possess equitable rights to the proceeds. How-
ever, Florida also finds that the dependents of the
convicted offender are victims of his offense l 9 be-
cause the conviction deprives them of his support.
The taxpayers who must bear the costs of prose-
cuting and incarcerating him are also victims. In
this manner, the Florida statute redistributes the
"windfall" profits of the offender to a broader class
of victims than the New York act does. In doing
so, however, the Florida act shows no more intent
to interfere with the offender's self-expression than
does the New York statute.
O'BRIEN TEST
Because these statutes are not primarily intended
to regulate the offender's speech, they are subject
to the O'Brien test to establish whether their collat-
eral effects on the offender's speech are constitu-
tional. In United States v. O'Brien,2 ° the Court held
that a federal law prohibiting the knowing destruc-
tion or mutilation of draft cards met the constitu-
tional mandates of the first amendment right of
expression. The Court established a test to deter-
mine when governmental interests in regulating
118 See note 9 supra.
"' The problem of the support of the family left behind
by the offender has been recognized as a potential prob-
lem in mandating restitution to the victim which may
otherwise have been applied to the support of the of-
fender's dependents. See, e.g., Note, The Minnesota Crime
Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 2 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 191 (1976).
'20 391 U.S. 367 (1968).-
the "non-speech" elements of a course of conduct
justify incidental limitations on first amendment
freedoms. 121 The regulation is justified if it meets
four requirements. First, the regulation must be
within the constitutional power of the government.
Second, it must further an important or substantial
governmental interest. Third, the governmental
interest furthered by the regulation must be unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression. Finally,
the incidental restriction on first amendment free-
doms cannot be greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.122
These statutes clearly meet the first part of the
O'Brien test. The state power to regulate commerce
within its borders and its police powers provide
adequate authority for the state to enact this leg-
islation. t23 Indeed, restitution is an ancient right
which has generated interest among the public,
commentators,, and state legislators in recent
years.
124
121 Id. at 376. The cases cited by O'Brien demonstrate
that the application of the rule delineated in that case is
not limited to "symbolic" speech, but extends to any
regulation of non-speech elements of a course of conduct
which may have a collateral impact on protected speech.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(right of Seventh-Day Adventist to collect unemployment
compensation where her dismissal was due to her refusal
to work on Saturdays); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
444 (1963) (regulation of the legal profession does not
justify prohibiting civil rights organization from advising
individuals of their rights and referring them to a partic-
ular attorney for assistance); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (insufficient justification for require-
ment that all organizations submit a list of their members
where the requirement has the effect of interfering with
first amendment rights); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 464 (1958) (state could not compel disclosure of
membership lists). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
15-17 (1976) (per curiam) (distinguishing conduct inter-
twined with expression, to which O'Brien applies, from
pure forms of expression involving free speech alone) and
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 79-80
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (applying O'Brien test to
justify zoning ordinances which restrict the location of
adult movie theatres).
'2 Id. at 377.
'
2 3 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1937), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-
31 (1963) ("It is now settled that States have power to
legislate against what are found to be injurious practices
in their internal communal and business affairs, so long
as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law."
(quoting Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)).
124 See, e.g., Restitution: Attention for Forgotten Victims of
Crime, 90 AM. CITY AND CouNTY 50 (1977); Jacob, Repar-
ation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to his Victim:
Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern Correctional
Process, 61 J. CRIM. L. & C. 152 (1970); Mikua, Victimless
Second, the statutes further the substantial gov-
ernmental interest in preventing unjust enrichment
of criminal offenders. 12 This interest in preventifig
unjust enrichment is clearly unrelated to the sup-
pression of protected speech. The statutes seek to
assure the proper distribution of the proceeds of
the story.
The New York statute may fail the final part of
the O'Brien test, the requirement that the alleged
incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms
not be greater than is essential for the furtherance
of the state's legitimate interests. The escrow ac-
count withholds the proceeds from the offender for
five years. This holding period may be more than
is necessary to fulfill the statute's anti-avoidance
motives. Except for wrongful death actions, the
statute of limitations established by the state for
tort claims is one or three years. This seems to
assume that three years should be adequate for
victims to perfect their claims. If this assumption
is true, the extra two years would simply penalize
the offender for selling the story of his crime.
However, the five year escrow period arguably
can meet the reasonableness test. The statute spe-
cifically benefits those victims who failed to bring
a tort action during the original statutory period
because the costs outweighed the potential for sat-
isfaction of a judgment. These victims may have
lost interest in the offender and will be difficult to
reach with the news of the unexpectedly available
resources. This five-year period gives the state a
reasonable opportunity to locate and notify the
victims of their rights to the escrow proceeds and
for the victims to perfect their rights by filing tort
actions.
The Florida statute avoids any problem of un-
necessary broadness by placing a statutory lien on
the proceeds as soon as they become payable or
accrue to the offender. The Department of Legal
Affairs then must take the necessary legal action to
perfect and enforce the lien. a26 The Florida provi-
sions provide no fixed holding period but rather
dispose of the proceeds as soon as the Department
of Legal Affairs becomes aware of their availability.
While its greater speed makes this approach pref-
erable, New York cannot adopt it because of the
differences in how that state distributes the funds.
In New York, there is no way of knowing how
Justice, 71 J. GRIM. L. & C. 189 (1980); 1978 Conn. Pub.
Acts No. 78-188, "Restitution to Victims by Criminal
Defendants"; 1979 La. Acts No. 734, "Restitution of
Victim as Condition of Parole."
1- See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
126 FLA. STAT. § 9 4 4 .5 12 (Supp. 1979).
much, if any, of the funds can be paid over to the
offender until all victims have had a reasonable
opportunity to be notified and perfect their claims.
By contrast, Florida is less concerned about maxi-
mizing the rights of victims to the proceeds. It
limits their interest in the funds to a maximum of
twenty-five percent of the proceeds. Further, it does
not provide any special holding period to give them
time to raise their claims, nor does it require any
attempt to notify them of the availability of the
funds as the New York statute does. Thus, the
different goals of the Florida act allow an imme-
diate determination of all interests in the funds,
victims, dependents, and the state while the nar-
rower New York focus on victims alone requires a
holding period to allow them to perfect their rights.
USE OF THE FUNDS TO COMMUNICATE
One commentator argues that the New York
statute works a major infringement on first amend-
ment rights by deterring the offender from telling
his story and the publisher from buying it.1 27 He
believes that the statute denies the offender access
to the funds which he could use to communicate
his ideas in violation of Buckley v. Valeo. 12 In Buckley,
the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 which
placed ceilings on expenditures by persons for a
clearly identified candidate, on a candidate's ex-
penditures from his own personal funds, and on
overall campaign expenditures. The provisions
"place[d] substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to
engage in protected political expression, restrictions
that the first amendment cannot tolerate."'' 2
The decision in Buckley is inapposite to the pro-
visions of the New York and Florida statutes. The
Federal Election Campaign Act placed direct re-
strictions on the use of funds for specified campaign
speech. By contrast, the New York and Florida acts
merely attach specified funds without regard for
how they would otherwise have been spent. To
find that the funds cannot be placed in escrow
because the offender could use the money to buy
advertisements protesting his innocence would pro-
hibit any fine or forefeiture of monies as a result of
a criminal conviction. Indeed, it would invalidate
attachment statutes of any kind since the debtor
could have used those funds to express protected
speech.
Furthermore, there is no indication that offend-
127 See Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 7, at 452.
'2 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'
2 9 Id. at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
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ers have ever used the proceeds from the stories of
their crimes to express protected speech. The most
common, and only recorded, use of such funds has
been to pay attorneys' fees and to support depen-
dents."
0
Finally, the very publication which provided the
attached funds will contain expressions of the of-
fender's thoughts and feelings concerning the
crime. Once the offender has sold his story, the
proceeds of that sale, like any other assets of the
offender, are subject to attachment for restitution-
ary purposes.
DuE PROCESS
Procedural due process constitutes the other ma-
jor area of constitutional concern regarding the
New York statute. Due process is implicated be-
cause the funds are held for the benefit of victims
of the offender without any preliminary determi-
nation, before or after the funds are attached, that




Due process of law requires that a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, appropriate to the nature
of the case, must precede any final deprivation of
an individual's property.132 In the case of the New
York statute, such an opportunity is provided by
the requirement that any payment out of the es-
crow account to a victim or to an attorney must be
pursuant to a judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction.l'0
However, in addition to a hearing before a final
deprivation of property, a hearing must be given
before any temporary, non-final deprivation or, in
extraordinary circumstances, immediately follow-
ing the commencement of the deprivation.'3 4 The
130 See note 2 supra.
131 See Compensating the Victim, supra note 7, at 99. The
statute has also been criticized on the due process ground
of impermissible vagueness. See Criminals-Turned-Authors,
supra note 7, at 462-65.
13 See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950). Although "[m]any controversies have
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause, there can be no doubt that at a minimum
they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at
313. See also Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 611-
12 (1974); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965);
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351
(1909); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876).
"' N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a (1), (8) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
"3 North Georgia Finishing v. DiChem, 419 U.S. 601
(1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 ruling).
Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance 1s first estab-
lished this rule by holding Wisconsin prejudgment
garnishment procedures invalid because they de-
nied the employee/debtor an opportunity to be
heard before the in rem seizure of her wages.'3 6
Although Sniadach involves the prejudgment
deprivation of employee wages which could impose
severe hardships upon the wage earner and his
family, it has not been limited to the protection of
a particular type of property interest. Courts have
expanded the rule to prevent any temporary dep-
rivation of property including household appli-
ances13 7 and corporate bank deposits. 138 In rejecting
an attempt to distinguish the early prejudgment
lien cases on the grounds that they represented the
deprivation of household necessities, the Court held
that it will not distinguish among different kinds
of property in applying the due process clause.
139
Withholding the offender's funds pursuant to
the New York statute is encompassed by the Snia-
dach rule. Like the garnishment provision ruled
unconstitutional in Sniadach, the New York statute
fails to provide any opportunity for a hearing
before the attachment of the funds to determine
"the validity, or at least the probable validity, of
the underlying claim."' 40 Under the terms of the
New York statute, there are several possible situa-
tions whereby an offender can be deprived wrong-
fully of the use of the funds for the five-year period
because of the failure of the statute to provide any
preliminary determination of possible claims to the
proceeds. First, a wrongful deprivation is certain to
occur under the statute where the offender has
committed a "victimless" crime which involved no
tortious conduct, such as fraud, prostitution, or
gambling. This is possible because section 632-a
requires the attachment of literary proceeds pay-
able to "any person accused or convicted of a crime
in this state,' ' 141 while the funds may only be
"3 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
136 Under the Wisconsin statute a creditor could have
a portion of the wages of the debtor frozen until the trial
of the garnishment action. The Court noted that al-
though the wage earner could eventually recover the
funds by winning the main suit on the merits, in the
interim he is "deprived of his enjoyment of earned wages
without any opportunity to be heard and to tender any
defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise."
Id. at 339.
137 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision).
13 North Georgia Finishing v. DiChem, 419 U.S. 601
(1975).
39 Id. at 608.140 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
141 N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 621(3) (McKinney 1972) defines
crime as an act commited in New York state which would
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claimed by victims or their legal representatives.
"Victim" is defined by the Crime Victims Com-
pensation Act, in which section 632-a is incorpo-
rated, as "a person who suffers personal physical
injury as a direct result of a crime.', 142 Because of
the interaction of these provisions, it is clearly
foreseeable that the profits of many authors" 3 may
be subject to the attachment provisions of the New
York act without any opportunity to challenge the
appropriateness of the deprivation.
The New York statute also fails to provide an
opportunity to challenge the correctness of the
publisher's determination to place the specific
funds into the hands of the Board. It is likely that
the publisher will mistakenly pay over funds which
are not payable to an offender or which are not
the proceeds of the story of a crime for which the
offender has been charged. Finally, a preliminary
determination is necessary to see whether even in
a violent crime it is likely that there are enough
victims who have large enough claims to justify the
withholding of the full amount of the profits.
The offender's possible status as a convicted
criminal does not impair him from raising due
process objections to the withholding of his literary
profits. Prisoners may not be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property without due process of law.'"
Although states may deny offenders physical pos-
session of money while they are in prison, they
cannot affect the constructive possession by pris-
oners of their funds without fulfilling the require-
ments of procedural due process. 145 Any action by
the state under the New York act to attach and
hold funds which are owed to the offender must
therefore comport with the Sniadach standards be-
cause it prevents him from assigning the funds to
other parties while he is in prison and of their
immediate use if he is not in prison.
Although Sniadach established the need for a
hearing before any temporary, non-final depriva-
tion of property, it also suggested that there may
be "extraordinary situations" in which such a pro-
cedure is not required. 46 This exception was spe-
if committed by a mentally competent criminally respon-
sible adult, who has no legal exemption of defense, con-
stitute a crime as defined in and proscribed by the penal
law..."
I42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 621(5) (McKinney 1972).
143 See, e.g., J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); H.
HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER (1978); X. HOLLANDER,
THE HAPPY HOOKER (1972); J. MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN
LIFE, ONE MAN'S ROAD TO WATERGATE (1974).
'44 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 556 (1974).
i45 Sell v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 873 (1978).
146 395 U.S. at 339.
cifically delineated in Fuentes v. Shevin 4 7 where the
Court found that under limited circumstances, a
balancing of the interests of the creditor and the
debtor will justify delaying the hearing until im-
mediately after the seizure of the property. To come
within this exception for delaying the hearing, the
state must meet three conditions. First, the seizure
must be directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second,
there must be a special need for very prompt
action. Finally, the state must keep strict control
over its monopoly of legitimate force-the person
initiating the seizure should be a governmental
official responsible for determining, under the stan-
dards of a narrowly drawn statute, that the seizure
is necessary and justified in the particular case. 48
A prompt post-deprivation hearing would be
constitutional under the provisions of the New
York act according to the Fuentes rule. 49 This
conclusion is demonstrated by comparing the pro-
visions of the New York act to the facts in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 150 In Calero-Toledo,
the Court applied the Fuentes test to uphold a
Puerto Rican statute which provided for the for-
feiture of vessels used for unlawful purposes with-
out any prior hearing.
15 1
First, the important governmental interest fur-
thered by the Puerto Rican statute was the need to
assert in rem jurisdiction over the property in order
to conduct full forfeiture proceedings. This was
held to foster the public interest in preventing
continued illicit use of the property and in enforc-
ing the criminal sanction of forfeiture.'I 2 Under the
New York statute, the state interest in preventing
unjust enrichment by the offender necessitates the
assertion of in rem jurisdiction over the funds.15 3
Secondly, the Calero-Toledo Court held that
prompt action is necessary because a preseizure
hearing might frustrate the interests served by the
statute because the property involved, a yacht,
147 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision).
" The need for an immediate postseizure hearing
where the circumstances justify the attachment without
a prior hearing was affirmed by the court in Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). There the Court
sustained a Louisiana sequestration statute because, inter
alia, "[t]here is far less danger [under the Louisiana
statute] that the seizure will be mistaken and a corre-
sponding decrease in the utility of an adversary hearing
which will be immediately available in any event." 416 U.S.
at 618 (emphasis added).
149407 U.S. at 91.
"m 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 679.
53 See notes 6- 10 and accompanying text supra.
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could be destroyed, concealed, or removed to an-
other jurisdiction if advance warning of confisca-
tion were given.'5 Similarly, since the New York
statute attaches funds at the time they become
payable to the offender, 1s the publisher would
have to pay them over to the offender during the
course of the preseizure hearing or render himself
liable under the contract. This would give the
offender an opportunity to take the possible courses
of conduct suggested in Calero-Toledo.
Finally, the Calero-Toledo Court held that self-
interested private parties may not initiate the sei-
zure mandated under the Puerto Rican statute,
but rather that Puerto Rican officials determine
whether the seizure is appropriate.15 Although
New York officials are not involved in the deter-
mination to pay the proceeds over to the Crime
Victims Compensation Board, the publisher is a
disinterested party with respect to the disposition
of the funds as required by Fuentes and can be
construed to be acting as an ageiht of the state in
initiating the seizure because the statute mandates
payment.
Although New York is allowed to delay the
necessary hearing until after the payment of the
funds into the escrow account, it must provide one
at that time. The requirements of such a hearing
have not been delineated specifically by the Court
except that it must provide a "real test" consistent
with the goal of preventing unfair and mistaken
deprivations of property by establishing the valid-
ity or at least the probable validity, of the under-
lying claim.1
5 7
In this case, due process would require a hearing
immediately after the establishment of the escrow
account to determine that there are likely to be
claimants, either attorneys or victims, to the funds
in the account and that those claims are likely to
encompass all of the money which has been seized.
If the offender has been convicted of the offense,
this determination would be relatively simple since
it could be based upon the findings of the criminal
case.
15
'" 416 U.S. at 679.155 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (1) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
'56416 U.S. at 679.
1.7 407 U.S. at 96-97.
'
58 Although the criminal conviction would not be
sufficient as a matter of law to establish the offender's
liability to the victims, it does constitute prima facie
evidence of the tortious actions. Vzenski v. Fitzsimmons,
10 A.D.2d 890, 201 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1960); Silverman v.
Abraham, 22 Misc. 2d 707, 198 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1960); Cf.,
Montalvo v. Morales, 18 A.D.2d 20, 239, N.Y.S.2d 72
(1963).
The Florida statute, by operating through a lien
procedure, apparently avoids the due process prob-
lems present under the operation of the New York
statute. Because only a statutory lien is created
under the Florida act, the offender will not be
deprived of the funds until the Department of
Legal Affairs brings a civil action to perfect the
lien and order the payment of the funds to the
parties entitled to final distribution. The offender
therefore has an opportunity to challenge the pro-
priety of any deprivation through the hearing to
perfect the lien before any deprivation is effected.
Although the Florida statute provides a means
of avoiding the due process problem present under
the New York act, it is not necessarily the best way
for New York and other states with statutes based
on the New York model to eliminate the problem.
The statutory lien procedure in Florida requires a
much quicker detdrmination of the proper distri-
bution of the funds. This may be acceptable be-
cause the victims' share is limited to twenty-five
percent of the monies. However, the New York act
demonstrates a greater interest in maximizing the
opportunities for victims to bring claims to the
funds. For New York, a simpler solution would be
to provide an immediate post-seizure hearing to
determine the validity of the deprivation based
extensively upon the record of the criminal case.
CONCLUSION
An important balance must be maintained be-
tween the first amendment rights of offenders and
equitable notions that a person should not be
allowed to profit as the result of his own wrong-
doing. The offender may provide a valuable pri-
mary source of information on many subjects of
public concern, such as crime prevention and cap-
ital punishment. The provision of material incen-
tives for the offender to sell his story, as provided
by the New York act, fulfills both the goal of
encouraging dissemination of information and pro-
viding restitution to the victim.
The Florida statute provides a significant alter-
native to the New York act. Florida has expanded
the class of victims entitled to the distribution of
these funds to include the dependents of the of-
fender and the state. Of the two statutes, the new
York act is superior. Both statutes attach funds
which can be attributed directly to the crime in
which the victim was injured. The New York stat-
ute provides the victim with a first claim to the
proceeds to the extent of his actual damages. The
Florida statute may give the victim considerably
19801
less than actual damages even when adequate
funds are available. Because victims should have
first rights to the funds to the extent of their
injuries, the Florida statute is inadequate.
The New York approach is preferable in other
ways also. Although there is evidence that an of-
fender will be motivated to sell his story by the
possibility that some of the proceeds will go to his
dependents, the availability of the literary proceeds
to pay the offender's legal expenses under the New
York statute provides the better incentive. Unlike
the Florida payments to dependents, it applies to
all offenders. The Florida statute may be attractive
because it distributes fifty percent of the offender's
profits to the state. The New York act is, however,
financially beneficial to the state because it may
save the state the expense of providing legal rep-
resentation. Historically, literary proceeds have
been most frequently used to pay legal expenses.
The New York approach employs this strong in-
centive but protects it from abuse by requiring
judicial approval of any payment to attorneys from
the funds.
The adoption of a statute based on the New
York model fulfills equitable needs which might
otherwise go unmet, and does not violate the pub-
lic's right to know or the offender's right to speak.
The statute however, must not extend beyond these
narrow goals. The statute only should attach funds
necessary to compensate victims for their injuries
and to pay attorneys' fees. A preliminary hearing
immediately following the attachment would pro-
tect against excessive attachment and satisfy due
process.
The statute should not become a tool for the
punishment of the offender. Such a statute would
be unfair not only because it is limited to those
offenders who sell their stories but also because it
is likely to deter the offender from ever telling his
story. Such a statute would block an important
channel of communication in violation of the first
amendment and effectively would eliminate funds
to compensate the victim. If the statute is used for
punitive purposes, neither the offender, nor society,
nor the victim is benefited.
It may offend the sensibilities of many individ-
uals to allow government to intervene as deeply
into the arena of protected communications as does
the New York statute. However, it is more offensive
to allow perpetrators of crimes of violence to profit
from their crimes while their victims go uncompen-
sated. The New York statute shows it is possible
for the equitable rights of the victim to be advanced
while safeguarding the constitutional rights of the
offender.
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